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Abstract:
In French as in other languages differentiating the perfective and the 
imperfective morphologically, modal verbs sometimes behave like implicative 
verbs in perfective sentences. The account of the data presented here is purely 
semantical and pragmatical in nature, contrary to Hacquard's (2006) one who 
proposes a structural account in terms of a scopal difference between the 
aspectual and the  modal operator. Our account relies on an ontological 
distinction that goes back to Aristotle between classical abilities and what we 
call action dependent abilities.
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Perfective and Imperfective in French
Kinds of abilities and Actuality Entailment
ALDA MARI & FABIENNE MARTIN
1. Introduction
This paper discusses the interaction between aspect and verbal polysemy. In 
French and in several other languages, modal verbs – but also illocutory or 
psychology verbs -- do not have exactly the same set of readings when used in 
perfective and imperfective sentences. To introduce the relevant facts, let us 
take the example of the modal verb pouvoir (can).   
As is well known, modal verbs like can differ from what Karttunen (1971) calls 
implicative verbs in that they do not entail an event satisfying the property 
denoted by their  infinitival complement (hence the possibility to deny the 
occurrence of an event of this type, cf. (1)) :
(1) He could open the door [OK but he didn’t do it].                      (modal verb)
--/->He opened the door.
(2) He managed to open the door [#but he didn’t open it].     (implicative verb)
--->He opened the door.
(3) He was managing to open the door [#but he wasn’t opening it].
--->He partly opened the door.
However, in French as in several other languages differentiating the perfective 
and imperfective morphologically like Italian or Hindi, modal verbs sometimes 
behave like implicative verbs in perfective sentences (Bhatt 1999, Hacquard 
2006). This is at least the case on their so called circumstantial readings (among 
others the abilitative and the goal-oriented ones). On these readings, denying 
the truth of the infinitival complement results in a contradiction, cf. (4a) and 
(5a). Following Bhatt (1999), we will say that in these cases, modal verbs 
trigger an  “actuality entailment” (AE).
(4) a. Marie a pu.PERF. s’enfuir, #mais elle ne s’est pas enfuie. (abilitative 
reading)
Marie could escape, but she didn’t do it.
(5) a. La carte m’a permis.PERF d’entrer dans la bibliothèque, #mais je ne suis 
pas entrée. (goal-oriented reading)
The card permitted. me to enter the library, but I didn’t do  it.
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The AE does not arise in perfective sentences (with the passé composé)1  on the 
epistemic and deontic readings, cf. (4b) and (5b), neither in imperfective 
sentences (with the imparfait), on no matter which reading, cf. (4c) and (5c). 
Examples (4)-(5) are taken from Hacquard (2006).
(4) b. Marie a pu.PERF. s’enfuir, comme elle a pu ne pas s’enfuir. (epistemic 
reading)
Marie could have escaped, as she could have not escaped
c. Marie pouvait.IMPERF. s’enfuir, OK mais elle ne s’enfuyait pas. (any 
reading)
Marie could escape, but she didn’t do it.
(5) b. Le doyen m’a permis.PERF. d’entrer dans la bibliothèque, OK mais je ne 
suis pas entrée. (deontic reading)
The dean permitted me to enter the library, but I didn’t do it.
c. La carte/le doyen me permettait.IMPERF d’entrer dans la bibliothèque, 
mais je ne suis pas entrée. (any reading)
The card/the dean permitted. me to enter the library, OK but I didn’t 
enter it.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the solutions of 
Bhatt and Hacquard. Section 3 points some of their shortcomings and presents 
new data. It is shown in this section that non-modal illocutory verbs like exiger 
'demand' or psychological verbs like encourager 'encourage' display a behavior 
similar to modal verbs. In Section 4, we present a new explanation of the facts. 
It relies on two hypothesis. Firstly, we follow Thomason (2005) on the idea that 
the abilitative can is a predicate modifier, and not a sentence modifier. 
Secondly, we introduce an ontological distinction between two kinds of 
abilities. Generic abilities correspond to the classical conception of abilities.  
An agent i has the  generic ability to perform an action of type A if i can 
perform an action a of type A as soon as i wants to and the circumstances are 
normal. Action dependent abilities do not survive the action which manifest 
them. Imagine that Peter was able yesterday to jump 9.7 m high because he was 
in an extraordinary shape this day. However, he would totally be unable to 
                                                
1 A terminological note is in order here. The passé composé can either be used as a 
Perfect (it is then a function which operates on an eventuality v and returns the result state s’ of 
v, cf. Kamp and Reyle 1993), or as an aoristic tense (since the “pure” aoristic tense, the passé 
simple, is hardly used in spoken French). On this second use, the passé composé is a perfective 
past, and like the passé simple, denotes a bounded eventuality. Crucially, all the contrasts 
presented below arise on the two readings of the passé composé, as well as when the passé 
composé is replaced by the passé simple. This suggests that it is a feature common to both 
tenses (on any of their readings) which plays a role here. However, as there is no common term 
which allows to contrast all the readings of these two tenses with the imparfait, we will stick 
with the tradition and oppose perfective to imperfective tenses, even if the passé composé does 
not have to be used as a perfective tense to trigger its particular behaviour under study here. 
The following abbreviations are used in the examples: PERF.= perfective and IMPERF.= 
imperfective; v is the variable standing for eventualities (state or event).
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renew this exploit even if he strongly wanted to. We can then attribute him an 
action dependent ability, but not a generic ability. Section 5 concludes and 
presents future lines of research, concerning e.g. the intriguing distribution of 
the dative argument in sentences under study.
2. Bhatt’s and Hacquard’s analyses
Bhatt multiplies lexical entries to explain the discrepancies in the semantic 
behavior of modal verbs. According to his analysis, modal verbs like pouvoir 
are in their circumstantial readings implicative verbs in disguise (or “fake” 
modal verbs).
The AE of pouvoir under the relevant readings (4a) and (5a) comes thus for 
free. He then explains why the AE vanishes in imperfective sentences by 
positing that imperfective morphology comes with an extra modal element, the 
generic operator GEN. As GEN does not require verifying instances (Krifka et 
al. 1995), no AE arises.
Hacquard sees two problems in Bhatt’s analysis. Firstly, as pointed out by Bhatt 
himself, it predicts that indisputably implicative verbs like réussir à (manage 
to) lose their implicative behavior when combined with imperfective 
morphology, which is not the case, cf. (3). Secondly, in positing two lexical 
entries, it leaves unexplained the robust cross-linguistic trend to use the same 
lexical item to express the whole set of readings illustrated in (4) and (5).
Hacquard keeps the Kratzerian view according to which modals share a core 
semantics in all their readings, and provides a structural account of the data, 
close in spirit to the one provided by Piñón (2003).2 Roughly, her threefold 
hypothesis is the following. 1° Despite aspectual/temporal morphology 
appearing on the modal itself, it is interpreted below the modal with deontic and 
epistemic readings. On the contrary, it is interpreted above the modal with 
circumstantial readings. 2° The AE arises when aspect scopes above the modal 
only. 3° The AE does not arise in (4c) and (5c) because the imperfective 
morphology comes with an extra modal component (as in Bhatt’s proposal).
3. Problems and new data
Hacquard’s analysis is not completely satisfactory either for four reasons. 
Firstly, it does not solve the first problem of Bhatt (any verb, included 
implicative verbs, is predicted to lose its implicative behavior in imperfective 
sentences). Secondly, in order for the analysis sketched above to work into 
                                                
2 Piñón (2003) already provides a structural account in terms of scope. But contrary to 
Hacquard, he does not take address directly the aspectual difference between perfective and 
imperfective sentences (although nothing in his analysis prevents an extension of it to account 
for these facts).
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details, Hacquard adopts several non classical assumptions about Aspect.3
Thirdly and more importantly, at least in French, modals do not always trigger 
the AE in perfective sentences under their circumstantial readings, contrary to 
what Hacquard assumes. The AE can be cancelled in at least two cases. Firstly, 
the AE is not compulsory when the context provides elements (in italics in (6) 
and (7) below) helping to make clear that the circumstances (or the ability, the 
opportunity to reach the goal) are temporally bounded. For instance, the 
durative adverbial in (6) triggers the relevant (magical) context where the card 
enabled the agent to use the library only for a precise lap of time. Weird 
contexts are often needed to conceive classical abilities as bounded (cf. (7)), but 
as soon as this special context is obtained, the AE disappears.
(6) La carte a permis pendant dix minutes seulement d’entrer dans la 
bibliothèque. OK Mais stupidement je n’en ai pas profité.
The card permitted.PERF for ten minutes only to enter the library. But
stupidly, I didn’t enjoy the opportunity.
(7) Notre nouveau robot a même pu.PERF repasser les chemises à un stade bien 
précis de son développement. OK Mais on a supprimé cette fonction (qui 
n’a jamais été testée) pour des raisons de rentabilité.
Our new robot could even iron shirts at a particular stage of its 
development. But we suppressed this function (which was never tested) 
for rentability reasons.
Secondly, the AE is not automatically triggered either when the infinitival 
complement contains a stative predicate (cf. (8)). Note that if avoir is 
reinterpreted as a dynamic predicate to mean obtenir ('obtain'), the AE is again 
compulsory. It is thus the stativity which is responsible for the cancellation of 
the AE in (8).4
                                                
3 1°Aspect is supposed to be base-generated as an argument of the verb, a position from 
which it needs to move out for type reasons (above or below the modal); 2° Aspect comes with 
its own world argument, which has to be bound locally; 3° This world argument must be bound 
by the modal if the modal is immediately above it (no AE arises), but cannot be bound by the 
modal if the modal is below it. In the latter case, the world argument of Aspect is bound by a 
matrix world binder (if the world argument of Aspect is the actual world, this yields the entailed 
event through a “principle of event identification across worlds”).
4 As the AE arises only when the infinitive is a non stative verb, it is important to 
compare the different readings of the modals with an infinitive of the same aspectual category. 
This is not systematically the case in the work of Hacquard, since she does not take into account 
the aspectual value of the infinitive. Interestingly, she tends to use stative infinitives when the 
modal has a reading which should not display the AE. For instance, for the deontic reading of 
devoir (triggering an AE), she uses an agentive infinitive (Pour aller au zoo, Jane a dû prendre 
le train, 'To go to the zoo Jane must-past-perf. take the train'), while for the epistemic reading of 
the same verb, she uses a stative infinitive (Darcy a dû aimer Lizzie, 'Darcy must-past-perf. love 
Lizzie'), cf. Hacquard id, pp. 23-24. We believe that this choice is not accidental and implicitly 
reveals that all other things being equal, AE arises less often with a stative infinitive. Note 
however that under its epistemic reading, devoir does not trigger the AE with an agentive 
infinitive either, as Hacquard expects. For instance, on the epistemological reading, “Jean a dû 
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(8) T’as pu.PERF avoir un repas gratuit, et tu ne t’es même pas levé !
You could have a meal for free, and you even didn’t get up !
Finally, a fourth potential problem for Hacquard's account is that the same kind 
of alternations is displayed with verbs which do not have a modal component 
(at least according to their traditional analyses), namely Object Experiencer 
verbs like encourager ('encourage') and illocutory verbs like inviter ('invite', cf. 
Martin 2007). Under their agentive readings, these verbs do not trigger an AE, 
no matter which tense is used, while on their non-agentive ones, they trigger an 
AE in sentences with the passé composé only:
(9) Pierre m'a encouragé.IMPERF. à entrer, mais je ne suis pas entrée.
Pierre encouraged me to enter, but I didn't enter.
(10)Ce panneau m'a encouragée.IMPERF. à entrer, #mais je ne suis pas entrée.
This panel encouraged me to enter, but I didn't enter.
(11)Ce panneau m'encourageait.IMPERF à entrer, OK mais je ne suis pas 
entrée.
This panel encouraged. me to enter, but I didn't enter.
(12)Pierre nous a invitésPERF. à tout reconsidérer, mais on ne l'a pas fait.
Pierre encouraged us to reconsider everything, but we didn't.
(13) Ces nouvelles données nous ont  invités.PERF. à tout reconsidérer, #mais 
on ne l'a pas fait.
These new data invited us to reconsider everything, but we didn't.
(14)Ces nouvelles données nous invitaient.IMPERF. à tout reconsidérer, OK 
mais on ne l'a pas fait.
The discovery of all these data invited us to reconsider everything, but 
we didn't
Verbs like  exiger de ('demand'), demander de ('ask'), pousser à ('push to', 'lead 
to'), interdire de ('to forbid to'), décourager ('discourage to') display the same 
contrast. To be sure, there are differences with the cases studied by Hacquard, 
but the similarity is also striking: an implication arises with the passé composé 
(vs the imparfait) and under a certain reading of the main verb only.   
Finally, let's note that a very similar contrast is triggered with illocutory verbs 
which do not (systematically) categorize an infinitival complement, but have a 
que-clause describing a proposition, cf. (15)-(17) below, or an object describing 
an event, cf. (18)-(20) (Martin, ibid.). This suggests that the alternation  is even 
more general than one could think at the first place:
                                                                                                                                 
manger un sandwich ce midi, 'Jean must-past-perf. eat a sandwich this midday' does not entail 
that Jean ate a sandwich. It only states that from all what I know, it is necessary that John ate a 
sandwich, but it leaves open the possibility that I'm not aware of other decisive pieces of 
evidence.
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(15)Pierre m'a suggéré.PERF. que la personne était sortie par la fenêtre, mais 
je ne pensais  pas que c'était le cas.
Pierre suggested to me that the person went out through the window, 
but I didn't think it was the case.
(16)Ces traces m'ont suggéré.PERF. que la personne était sortie par la 
fenêtre, #mais je ne pensais pas que c'était le cas.
These ground tracks suggested to me that the person went out through 
the window, but I didn't think it was the case.
(17)Ces traces me suggéraient.IMPERF. que la personne était sortie par la 
fenêtre, OK mais je ne pensais pas que c'était le cas.
These ground tracks suggested to me that the person went out through 
the window,  but I didn't think it was the case.
(18)Pierre a exigé.PERF. de l'attention, OK mais je ne lui en ai pas accordé.
Pierre demanded attention, but I didn't pay any to him.
(19) Ce travail a exigé.PERF. de l'attention, #mais je n'en ai pas accordé.
This work demanded attention, but I didn't pay any.
(20)Ce travail exigeait.IMPERF. de l'attention, OK mais je n'en ai pas accordé.
This work demanded attention, but I didn't pay any.
As illustrated by (15)-(17), with suggérer, the referent of the dative argument is 
committed to the truth of its que-clause with a non-agentive subject in 
sentences with passé composé only. On the other hand, exiger entails the 
occurrence of an event satisfying the event description provided by its object in 
the same conditions. We suggest that these two additional sets of data have the 
same roots as the more restrictive contrast studied by Bhatt and Hacquard. It is 
of course difficult to cover these two new sets of constrasts involving non-
modal verbs if the explanation relies as in Hacquard's account on a scopal 
difference between the aspectual and the modal component.
4. A semantic (non structural) account
The alternative analysis proposed here explain the extended set of data 
presented above without assuming a structural difference between the two sets 
of readings of modals. Like Hacquard, we keep Kratzer's hypothesis that 
pouvoir is monosemous, in the sense that it has the same meaning on its 
implicative or non-implicative readings. However, contrary to the previous 
accounts, we do not assume that the imperfective morphologically 
systematically comes with a modal operator cancelling the AE triggered at the 
lexical level; the fact illustrated in (3) – implicative verbs keep their implicative 
behavior in imperfective sentences – is not problematic anymore. We also give 
up the idea the under circumstantial readings, modal verbs systematically 
trigger the AE in perfective sentences.
Our account focuses on an important property differentiating the passé composé 
and the imparfait which hardly plays a role in the previous accounts. Sentences 
with the passé composé are bounded (they denote an event which has reached 
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its final boundary),5 while sentences with the imparfait are unbounded (they 
denote an event which is by default supposed to continue afterwards). The idea 
explored below is that it is the “Boundedness Constraint” associated to the 
perfective which is responsible for the entailment.  The proposed analysis rests 
on a distinction between two types of abilities. We will introduce this 
ontological distinction before showing how the proposed hypothesis can 
account for the data.
4.1. Two types of abilities
Generic abilities (GAs) correspond to the traditional conception of abilities, as 
it is developed for instance by Kenny (1975). They can be defined by three 
ontological properties (cf. [i]-[iii] above) and an epistemological one (cf. [iv]):
[i] GAs do not require verifying instances (one does not have to kill a rabbit to 
have the GA to kill a rabbit);
[ii] GAs are ascribed to an agent i only if i could perform repeatedly the action 
if he wanted to;
[iii] GAs are conceived by default as unbounded (temporally persistent): if a 
GA is ascribed to i in t, it is typically assumed that i has the same GA in some 
t'כt;6
[iv] GAs are a positive explanatory factor in accounting for the agent's 
performing an action (attributing to the agent i the GA to perform the action a
can explain the fact that he performs a; “he was able to do it, so he did it”)
Note that the English predicate have the ability to (and the French one avoir la 
capacité de) seems to denote exclusively abilities satisfying the three points [i]-
[iv] just mentioned, while be able to (and the French predicate être capable de) 
has a broader extension. Let us compare for instance the two examples below:
(21) Brown was able to hit three bull's eyes in a row.
                                                
5 Note that this is true on the two readings of the passé composé. Used as a Perfect, it is 
a function which operates on an eventuality v and returns the result state s’ of v (Kamp and 
Reyle 1993). As de Swart (2007) emphasises, on this use, it requires v to be bound, since it 
returns the resulting state of v. On its aoristic use, the passé composé is a perfective past, and as 
the passé simple, denotes a bounded eventuality. Recall that as emphasised in note 2, replacing 
the passé composé by the passé simple does not change anything to the contrasts above. This 
suggests that it is well and truly the boundedness (and not another feature of the Perfect) which 
plays a role here.
6 Condoravdi already proposes to consider that individual level predicates (ILPs) like be 
intelligent trigger an inference of this kind (and generic abilities are very similar to the 
dispositions denoted by ILPs): “ILPs are associated with an inference of temporal persistence 
[...] [which] specifies the following: if an eventuality is going on at time t and you have no 
information that it is not going on at some later time t’, then infer it is going on at that later time 
t’ as well. Note that this is a default inference, surfacing only if there is no information to the 
contrary.”(Condoravdi 1992:92)
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(22) Brown had the ability to hit three bull's eyes in a row.
As Thalberg (1972) and Piñón (2003) already noticed, (21) does not entail (22). 
(22) is true only if Brown could repeat his performance if he wanted to (the act 
of hitting three bull's eyes in a row is conceived as the non accidental result of a 
previous training which would allow Brown to repeat it). On the contrary, (21) 
can be true if the performance of Brown is conceived as accidental (vs. as the 
result of a previous training) and non-repeatable: he did it and thus could do it. 
The question is now the following: what does be able to (or être capable de) 
denote when the performance is conceived as accidental and non-repeatable?
The answer offered by Thalberg (1972) is that on this reading, be able to is a 
predicate of action, whose meaning is roughly similar to the one of to do, 
modulo some additional implicatures. However, this solution raises difficulties. 
Firstly, as already emphasised by Piñón (2003), the link between the two be 
able to is not transparently conveyed in the lexicon anymore. Secondly, neither 
be able to nor être capable de can be used as typical action predicates in 
discourse. For instance, the C is not a felicitous answer to A:
(23) A. Qu'est-ce que Pierre faisait quand tu es entrée?
B. Il mangeait un sandwich.
C. #Il pouvait manger un sandwich
A. What was doing Pierre when you entered?
B. He was eating a sandwich.
C. #He was able to eat a sandwich.
Besides, they cannot be used in perception reports, which is unexpected if they 
are semantically equivalent to an action predicate:
(24) *J'ai vu Paul pouvoir manger un sandwich.
*I saw Paul be able to eat a sandwich
The answer proposed here is that on the relevant reading, (21) denotes what we 
propose to call an action dependent ability (ADA). They have four properties 
differentiating from GAs (again three ontological ones, and an epistemological 
one): 
[i’] ADAs require an action to exist — actually, an ADA ontologically depends 
on the corresponding action7
                                                
7 The dependence relation between an ADA and the action through which it occurs may 
be defined as a generation relation (Goldman 1970), as a case of supervenience (Kim 1974) or 
aggregation (Kratzer 1989). Engelberg (2005) uses the Kimian concept of supervenience of 
define the relation taking place between the eventuality denoted by German verbs like helfen 
('help') and the one described by the action through which the help is performed. Martin (2006) 
uses the generation relation to define the relation between two eventualities described in 
sentences like In doing the dishes, he was clever (the temporary 'in action' state of cleverness is 
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[ii’] ADAs are weaker abilities than GAs because a unique and non repeatable 
performance suffices to imply the corresponding ADA8
[iii’] ADAs have the same temporal boundaries than the action on which they 
depend and are thus bounded (Paul was able to hit three bull’s eyes in a row 
exactly at the interval t he hit three bull’s eyes in a row)
[iv] The attribution to the agent i of the ADAs to do the action a is not typically 
used as an explanation of the fact that i did a. It is rather because a performs an 
action a that we attribute him the ADAs to perform a (“he did it, so he was able 
to do it”).
In summary, the meaning of a predicate like être capable de or the abilitative 
pouvoir has a broader extension than the predicate avoir la capacité de because 
it can either denote an GA or the corresponding ADA. We do not assume two 
lexical entries for être capable de or the abilitative pouvoir, but assume instead 
that the semantics of these predicates (provided in section 5) is underspecified 
and that the relevant reading is chosen through contextual factors like tense, 
aspect or rhetorical relations.
4. New proposal
Let us now turn back to the new analysis of the data to be explained. We 
assume that modal verbs are stative and introduce a state s (which corresponds 
eg to an ADA or a GA). Recall that as emphasised above, the passé composé 
requires the eventuality v (or, when they are several, one of the eventualities) 
denoted by the sentence to be bounded, ie to have reached its final boundary. In 
a nutshell, our hypothesis is the following:  the AE is triggered when the 
eventuality v described by the matrix verb (i) is the only one which can satisfy 
the ”Boundedness Constraint” associated to the passé composé under its two 
readings and (ii) ontologically depends on an action a satisfying the description 
given in the infinitive. If another eventuality v' which does not depend on such 
an action a can satisfy the Boundedness Constraint, the AE is not compulsory
(HYP. 1). We will now show how HYP. 1 accounts for the relevant data. 
Abilitative readings of modal verbs: ADAs vs GAs. Let us address first to 
classical case of modal verbs on their abilitative readings. The idea is roughly   
the following: it is only when the modal verb is forced to denote an ADA that 
the AE arises, since ADAs ontologically depend on an action (of the type 
denoted by the infinitive) whereas GAs do not require any instantiation. Ceteris 
paribus, the choice of the passé composé will then invite the modal verb to 
denote an ADA rather than a GA, since ADAs are by default conceived as 
bounded, and GAs as unbounded.
                                                                                                                                 
'generated by' the action of doing the dishes). This relation is very similar to the one at study 
here: again, the state s has the same temporal boundaries as the action on which it depends. 
8 Elgesem (1997) already proposes that abilities do not always require repeatability.
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Let us now go through the examples in more details. When the sentence is 
imperfective as in (4c), it can easily describe a GA, since it is naturally 
conceived as unbounded. As a GA does not require a performance, no AE 
arises:
(4) c. Marie pouvait s'enfuir, OK mais elle ne s'enfuyait pas. 
Marie could escape, but she didn’t do it.
By contrast, being perfective, (4a) is by default understood as denoting an 
ADA, because ADAs are by definition bounded (cf. [iii’] above). As an ADA 
taking place in t depends on a co-temporal action (cf. [i’]), (4a)  entails an 
action a in t:
(4) a. Marie a pu.PERF. s’enfuir, #mais elle ne s’est pas enfuie. 
Marie could escape, # but she didn’t do it.
The robot’s example (7) contains a perfective sentence too. But it still manages 
to describe a GA, because the context helps to conceive the GA as bounded (the 
adverbial in italics cancels the inference triggered by default that the ability is 
temporally persistent). Thus, given [i] (GA does not require instances), the AE 
disappears:
(7) Notre nouveau robot a même pu.PERF repasser les chemises à un stade bien 
précis de son développement. OK Mais on a supprimé cette fonction (qui 
n’a jamais été testée) pour des raisons de rentabilité.
Our new robot could even iron shirts at a particular stage of its 
development. But we suppressed this function (which was never tested) 
for rentability reasons.
When the infinitival complement contains a stative predicate like in (8), it is 
even easier to avoid the interpretation where the modal verb denotes an ADA 
(and thus triggers the AE):
(8) T’as pu.PERF avoir un repas gratuit, et tu ne t’es même pas levé !
You could have a meal for free, and you even didn’t get up !
In fact, with a stative verb, the predicate pouvoir cannot receive its abilitative 
reading, because there is no ability to be in a certain state. This restriction 
reflects on the distribution of “abilitative-only” modal verbs like avoir la 
capacité de, which cannot combine with stative verbs:
(25) #J'ai la capacité d'avoir les cheveux longs.
I have the ability to have long hair.
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Thus in (8), what is bounded is not an ability, but a circumstance. As a bounded 
circumstance does not ontologically depend on an action satisfying the 
infinitive, no AE arises.
However, if the stative predicate is coerced in an agentive one (which is 
possible in (8), where avoir 'to have' can be reinterpreted as meaning obtenir 'to 
obtain'), then the modal verb can instantiate its abilitative reading again. In a 
sentence with passé composé, the abilitative reading denotes preferentially an 
ADA (cf. above), and as a result, the AE is triggered.
The epistemic and pure circumstantial reading of modal verbs. Let us now 
address the other readings of modal verbs, and firstly the “pure circumstantial”9
one (under which pouvoir is roughly paraphrasable by avoir la possibilité de). 
On this reading, the state s denoted by the modal verb corresponds to a certain 
state of the world enabling the agent to do something. As this state does not 
ontologically depend on an action, pouvoir does not trigger the AE. For 
instance, (25) does not entail that Pierre took the train when pouvoir is 
paraphrasable by avoir la possibilité de ('have the ability to'):
(26) Pierre a pu prendre le train pour Londres, et cet imbécile ne l'a pas fait.
Pierre could take the train for London, and this imbecil didn't do it.
Note however that for this reading to be completely natural with the passé 
composé, one should provide a particular context which justifies that the 
circumstances at hand are conceived as bounded. After all, in a default context, 
if Pierre missed a train for London, we generally assume he can take the 
following one; in other words, circumstances of this type are conceived as 
unbounded. But (26) is perfectly fine in a less normal world where having the 
possibility to take the train for London is quite an exceptional thing. Without 
this context, either the imparfait fits better the speaker's intention, or the 
interpreter tends naturally to interpret  pouvoir on its abilitative reading as 
denoting an ADA, and then the AE is triggered.10
When the modal instantiates its epistemic reading in a perfective sentence as in 
(4b), we assume that it denotes a state s corresponding to a certain epistemic 
possibility (the state s during which p can be true, from all what the speaker  
knows, p being the proposition described by the infinitive). Arguably, epistemic 
possibilities are  easily be conceived as bounded. The Boundedness Constraint 
associated to the passé composé is thus already satisfied. As an epistemic 
                                                
9 The “pure circumstantial” reading is one of the circumstantial readings, which also 
count the abilitative and  the goal-oriented one. What we propose for the pure circumstantial 
reading can roughly be applied to the goal-oriented reading of modal verbs, which is sometimes 
quite difficult to distinguish from the pure circumstantial reading, except the fact that a 
constituant from the sentence (like a in order-phrase) specifies the goal of the agent.
10 Hacquard (2006) assumes that the AE is triggered in the pure circumstantial reading. 
We disagree with her judgement. 
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possibility certainly does not depend on an action to take place, no AE arises 
either.11
Psych-verbs and illocutory verbs. As emphasised below, our proposal also 
aims to account for the fact that  the implicativity of non modal verbs like 
encourager or inviter also covaries with the choice of the tense.  Examples (9)-
(14) built with such verbs  are repeated below for convenience:
(9) Pierre m'a encouragé.IMPERF. à entrer, mais je ne suis pas entrée.
Pierre encouraged me to enter, but I didn't enter.
(10)Ce panneau m'a encouragée.IMPERF. à entrer, #mais je ne suis pas entrée.
This panel encouraged me to enter, but I didn't enter.
(11)Ce panneau m'encourageait.IMPERF à entrer, OK mais je ne suis pas 
entrée.
This panel encouraged. me to enter, but I didn't enter.
(12)Pierre nous a invitésPERF. à tout reconsidérer, mais on ne l'a pas fait.
Pierre encouraged us to reconsider everything, but we didn't.
(13)Ces nouvelles données nous ont  invités.PERF. à tout reconsidérer, #mais 
on ne l'a pas fait.
These new data invited us to reconsider everything, but we didn't.
(14)Ces nouvelles données nous invitaient.IMPERF. à tout reconsidérer, OK 
mais on ne l'a pas fait.
The discovery of all these data invited us to reconsider everything, but 
we didn't.
The easy cases are the agentive readings (9) and (12) with the passé composé, 
and the stative readings (11) and (14) with the imparfait. Examples (9) and (12) 
do not yield an AE simply because the action a of Pierre (his encouragement or 
invitation) already provides the bounded v demanded by the passé composé.   
Example (11)  denotes a state s of the subject, for instance the panel's state 
consisting of encouraging visitors to enter  (through eg a welcome inscription). 
In this example, the choice of the imparfait is plainly justified, because this 
state s is by default conceived as unbounded: one does not assume that the 
panel endures a change of state during my visit. Precisely because s is 
conceived as unbounded in the default context, sentence (10) is by default not 
understood as denoting the same state as (11), since the passé composé needs a 
bounded eventuality. The most obvious way to feed the passé composé with 
such an eventuality is to interpret encourager as denoting this time the
psychological effect that the panel triggered on me. Now, it would be rather odd 
to describe the panel as triggering the effect of encouraging me to enter if I 
                                                
11 We thank Michael Hegarty (c.p.) for his suggestion about the epistemic readings of 
modal verbs.
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didn't enter.12 Hence the AE. An alternative way to fill the Boundedness 
Constraint in (10)  is to provide a context which forces to conceive some 
bounded state s of the same type as the one denoted in (11), for instance with 
the help of a durative adverbial. For instance, let us imagine an electronic panel 
displaying a welcoming message for fifteen seconds only. Then, a sentence like 
Le panneau m'a encouragé pendant 15 secondes à entrer ('The panel 
encouraged.PERF me to enter for 15 seconds') does not trigger the AE, because 
the Boundedness Constraint imposed by the passé composé is this time filled by 
the panel's state s.  The contrast (13)-(14) can be accounted for exactly in the 
same way. 
Hacquard's examples containing the illocutory verb permettre can also be 
explained independently of its modal component. The relevant contrast (5a)-
(5b) are repeated below:
(5) a. La carte m’a permis.PERF d’entrer dans la bibliothèque, #mais je ne suis 
pas entrée. 
The card permitted. me to enter the library, but I didn’t do  it.
b. Le doyen m’a permis.PERF. d’entrer dans la bibliothèque, OK mais je ne 
suis pas entrée. 
The dean permitted me to enter the library, but I didn’t do it.
c. La carte me permettait.IMPERF d’entrer dans la bibliothèque, OK mais je ne suis 
pas entrée.
The card permitted me to enter the library, but I didn't do it.
In (5b), the action of the dean provides the bounded v asked for by the passé composé. 
As an agentive permission to do a does not entail a performance of a, no AE arises in 
(5b). In (5c), permettre denotes a state s of the card, namely the state consisting of 
having the properties of enabling its user to enter the library. As a card is usually 
assumed to keep these properties through time, s is conceived by default as unbounded, 
hence the imparfait. Precisely because of this, (5a)  -- which contains a passé composé 
--  is typically not understood as denoting the same state s as (5c), except if a durative 
adverbial helps us to magically conceive this state s as bounded, which is the case in 
(6):
                                                
12 Rather odd but not impossible. For instance, I could say Le panneau m'a encouragé à 
entrer ('the panel encouraged-past-perf. me to enter') just to report the psychological effect 
triggered by the panel on me, and add that nevertheless, I finally decided to go against this 
feeling and chose not to enter. In this very particular context, (10) does not trigger the AE 
anymore, and the presence of the passé composé is still justified because the reported 
psychological effect is bounded. So stricto sensu, one does not deal with an entailment in (10), 
but rather with a strong implicature.
Note that an important difference between the interpretation of encourager in (10) and 
(11) is that in the second case, the verb denotes an “objective” encouragement, in the sense that 
the encouraging properties of the state does not depend on what the Experiencer thinks of it. On 
the contrary, in (11), encourager denotes a “subjective” encouragement, in the sense that the 
effect induced by the panel on the Experiencer depends on the way the Experiencer evaluated 
it. On this point, see Martin (2006 & forthcoming).
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(6) La carte a permis pendant dix minutes seulement d’entrer dans la 
bibliothèque. OK Mais stupidement je n’en ai pas profité.
The card permitted.PERF for ten minutes only to enter the library. But 
stupidly, I didn’t enjoy the opportunity.
As such a state s does not ontologically depend on an action a, no AE arises. A 
natural way to fill the Boundedness Constraint in (5a) without the help of an 
adverbial consists in interpreting permettre as denoting the enabling effect
resulting from the use of the card (namely the effect of enabling me to enter the 
library). Indeed, such an eventuality is this time easily conceived as bounded, 
since it shares the boundaries of an action. But this of course implies that I 
performed the action a, hence the AE.
Influence of aspect on the meaning of other verbs. As mentioned in Section 
3, choosing the passé composé instead of the imparfait may also have a 
comparable effect to the one previously described on verbs which do not 
systematically subcategorise an infinitival complement (cf. the examples (15)-
(20) partly repeated below). For instance, recall that tense interacts with the 
interpretation of suggérer also when this verb is used with a que-clause,  as in 
(15)-(17):
(15)Pierre m'a suggéré.PERF. que la personne était sortie par la fenêtre, mais je 
ne pensais  pas que c'était le cas.
Pierre suggested to me that the person went out through the window, 
but I didn't think it was the case.
(16)Ces traces m'ont suggéré.PERF. que la personne était sortie par la 
fenêtre, #mais je ne pensais pas que c'était le cas.
These ground tracks suggested to me that the person went out through 
the window, but I didn't think it was the case.
(17)Ces traces me suggéraient.IMPERF. que la personne était sortie par la 
fenêtre, OK mais je ne pensais pas que c'était le cas.
These ground tracks suggested to me that the person went out through 
the window,  but I didn't think it was the case.
Let us call p the proposition denoted by the que-clause of suggérer. The que-
clause of the verb penser 'think' of the second sentence roughly denotes the 
same proposition p (because of the anaphorical link provided by ce). Besides, 
let us call A the Experiencer denoted by the dative of suggérer (which corefers 
with the subject of penser 'think' in the second part of the sentence). The facts 
illustrated in (15)-(17) can be restated as follows: A must assume p to be true if 
and only if the subject of the matrix verb suggérer is non-agentive and the 
sentence is perfective.
Basically, these data can be explained in the same way as for encourager. In 
(15), the action of Pierre (namely a speech act having p as its content) provides 
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the bounded v demanded by the passé composé. Roughly, the effect f that the 
performer of such a speech act is pursuing is that his addressee believes that p 
(generally, one suggests that p to A because one wants A to believe p). As this 
kind of speech act can obviously be performed without the desired effect f to be 
triggered, A does not have to believe that p. In (17), the verb is this time 
interpreted as denoting a state s of the ground tracks, namely simply the state of 
being present there and thereby suggesting that p to the perceiver of these 
tracks. As this state is by default conceived as unbounded – the tracks are not 
assumed to disappear suddenly -- the choice of the imparfait is justified. 
Precisely for this very reason, (16) is not interpreted as reporting the same state 
as (17), since the passé composé needs a bounded eventuality. A natural way to 
fill the Boundedness Constraint of this tense is to interpret suggérer as denoting 
the psychological effect v that the ground tracks triggered on A, namely that 
they made A think by their presence that p. But again, it would odd to report 
such an effect in A if A is presented as not believing that p. Hence the oddity in 
(16).13 The examples (18)-(20) can be accounted for in the same way too.
6. Conclusions and perspectives
In summary, we have tried to show that it is possible to explain when and why 
implicative readings of modal verbs are compulsory without appealing to 
syntactical movements, on the basis of the classical semantic analysis of the 
perfective and imperfective tenses, and of a difference between two types of 
abilities, which is independently philosophically motivated. Another advantage 
of our proposal is that it does not rely on a fine-grained typology of non-
abilitative readings of modal verbs, which are sometimes not so easy to 
differentiate (whereas this fine-grained typology is vital for approaches à la 
Hacquard).
To conclude, we would like to present two problems related to the one under 
study here. As far as we know, they have never been addressed in previous 
literature and are thus unsolved. 
The dative argument. The first one concerns the syntactical status of the 
dative argument in previous examples. As a general rule, this argument behaves 
like an adjunct in sentences with the passé composé which do not trigger the 
AE (or a similar inference), as well as in sentences with the imparfait. For 
instance, its presence is not compulsory in (5b), (5c), (6), (9), (11), (14), (15) 
and (17). However, in every case studied here, the dative argument behaves like 
an argument in sentences with the passé composé which trigger the AE (or a 
similar inference). For instance, its presence is obligatory in (5a), (10), (13) and 
(16). 
                                                
13 Again, (16) can be acceptable in a very particular context where the tracks induced in 
A the thought that p, but where A finally rejected this precise thought. So again, we are dealing 
with a strong implicature and not with an entailment.
MARI  &  MARTIN                                                        17
The  imparfait. second problem concerns the distribution of the imparfait. 
The semantics. A proper semantics remains of course to be developed. 
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